From 6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2014 14:39:48 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
Git-commit: 6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818
Patch-mainline: 3.17-rc3
References: CVE-2014-3185,bnc#896391

This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.

Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/whiteheat.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/whiteheat.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/whiteheat.c
@@ -1006,6 +1006,10 @@ static void command_port_read_callback(s
 		dbg("%s - command_info is NULL, exiting.", __func__);
 		return;
 	}
+	if (!urb->actual_length) {
+		dbg("%s - empty response, exiting.\n", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
 	if (status) {
 		dbg("%s - nonzero urb status: %d", __func__, status);
 		if (status != -ENOENT)
@@ -1027,7 +1031,8 @@ static void command_port_read_callback(s
 		/* These are unsolicited reports from the firmware, hence no
 		   waiting command to wakeup */
 		dbg("%s - event received", __func__);
-	} else if (data[0] == WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS) {
+	} else if ((data[0] == WHITEHEAT_GET_DTR_RTS) &&
+		(urb->actual_length - 1 <= sizeof(command_info->result_buffer))) {
 		memcpy(command_info->result_buffer, &data[1],
 						urb->actual_length - 1);
 		command_info->command_finished = WHITEHEAT_CMD_COMPLETE;
